Define the State and Define its Borders

In the novel The City and the City, the border between the fictional cities of Bezel and Ul Qoman are regarded with utmost care and importance. This book teaches its reader that borders, however complicated their structure might appear, increase regulation or social norms, security, and the identity of people within them. It is important to define a system of governance to understand its geographic borders. Borders, as they exist for failed states, are not a reflection of their systems of governance. One such state is Afghanistan. Although categorized as a failed state- a state that has lost monopoly on violence and fails to provide quality and quantity of political goods to citizens- Afghanistan is not lacking a government structure, like Somalia (Rotberg 2009). What emerges from failed states, like Afghanistan when the nation fell under Taliban rule, is a regression from the contemporary state to feudal-like society with city-state-like qualities of sovereignty. While “Afghan identity” remains landlocked, internal factionalism reveals that the border misrepresents other competing identities within Afghanistan’s geography. Consequently, if the concept of “failed states” was broadened and states were labeled “failing” instead of “failed,” borders could remain and the interpretation and policy attitude towards that state could be more effective in aiding the state back to stability. This analysis reflects what systems of governance are legitimized through the process of labeling Afghanistan a “failed state.” If Afghanistan were labeled “failing,” these forms of governance could just be seen as part of the process.

The Afghan system of governance mirrors aspects of feudalism. The Church used to ‘claim all’ under its jurisdiction, essentially undermining the authority of other bodies of governance, like the royals (Spruyt 1994). The lack of separation between church and ‘state’ is key in understanding the function of feudal society. In Afghan society, Taliban rule monopolized on violence and ‘claimed all,’ much like the Church. Like the Church in feudal Europe, the Taliban held final jurisdiction over all diverse ethnicities throughout the land.  Undermining forward thinking traditions, the Taliban established a societal system exclusive to men and a judicial system based on personal ties to Islam and violence to establish order. People and crimes against the ‘state’ are tried under Islamic law. People, regardless of how dispersed they live from one another or their proximity to central cities, are ‘subjects’ under Taliban rule; the people are forced and manipulated into submission as power in society remains exclusive to the Taliban.

Afghanistan is also set-up in a city-state like manner. Traditionally, the city-state module is best represented by factionalized Italy between the 10^th through 15^th century (Spruyt 1994). The city of Kabul is where power is most centralized in Afghanistan. Outside the border of the city in rural villages and smaller cities, ethnic factionalism prevails. These ethnic divides mirror the Italy city-state structure because varying cultural identities kept the cities, and thus the people, from integrating. The Italians saw themselves as culturally different and therefore sovereign from one another. While this worked to keep trade competitive, this made defining borders complicated and unstable for the Italians (Spruyt 1994). Unlike the Italians, outside of the main city people remain “Afghan,” however, like the Italians people live along ethnic and cultural divides (Stalker 2013). Such divides include the major ethnic groups like Pashtums, Tajks, and Hazara (Stalker 2013). Each of these ethnic groups attains a different social role in Kabul, but outside of the city, jurisdiction remains questionable. What keeps some homogenized order is the fear of Taliban rule and strict adherence to Islamic law. But since Taliban rule is not sovereign, the border outside of Kabul is hard to define, thus making Afghanistan a city-state structure.
            According to the Oxford Reference, Afghanistan exports fruits, carpets, and opium. Trade, therefore, has not halted despite the lack of a state-like structure regulating such trade. This trade structure resembles the Italian city-state structure because trade played an important role in retarding integration of the state in Italy, as previously mentioned. Afghanistan is one of the world’s largest exporters of Opium (Stalker 2013). During Taliban rule, the exports dropped drastically under their jurisdiction and restriction. However, Opium still continues to be one of their biggest exports. In fact, most of the world’s Opium comes from Afghanistan. While poppy seeds serve varying purposes, the illegal drug trade remains affluent in Afghanistan (Stalker 2013). The absence of strong government regulation is beneficial to participants of the Opium drug trade. Paired with ethnic divides, this becomes more reason for the Afghan population to remain divided, much like the Italian city-state structures. With trade established in favor of merchants, or farmers in Afghanistan’s case, it does not make sense to give up that economic power to a government entity, as was done periodically under Taliban rule. Loosely defined borders make it easier for black market activities to thrive.
             By looking at Afghanistan’s political structure, borders become problematic as they affect the international community’s capacity to communicate and coordinate with a bound-less society. However, by not giving accurate sovereignty to the political structures that do exist, the international community runs the risk of impeding aid and development, and thus hinders the economic and political integration of failed state regions. Because the international community did not recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban, the title of “failed state” makes policy makers “single out countries that should be of utmost concern” (Rotberg 2009). A more accurate term, as Rotberg suggests, would be to categorize nation-states on the cusp of failure as “weak” or “failing” to draw more attention on how to best deal with them (Rotberg 2009). By this definition, the borders that remain, whether they be landlocked or not, a more accurate depiction of the region is supported by the concept of the sovereign state through its struggles and downfalls. By deeming it “failed,” this title proposes that the drawn borders are an inaccurate representation of the internal sovereign structures that arise. If one examines Afghanistan through a “failed state” lens, then the real border should be drawn around Kabul where power is most centralized, as it resembles a more city-state structure. When observed under Taliban rule, the borders become even harder to define as Islamic law is used as a manipulative tool to “claim all” as was done by the Church in feudal European society. There may not be a clear answer for how to interpret borders of failed states, but a factor in untangling the mystery might be to redefine how one categorizes “failed states.” Has the state completely failed? Is there some form of government? If so, maybe such state should be looked upon as “failing” as potential new systems (or old systems) of governance surface and compete.  With a “failing” or “weak” status, borders can remain ‘intact.’

Works Cited

Rotberg, Robert I. "Disorder In The Ranks." Foreign Policy 173 (2009): 91.             Political Science Complete. Web. 4 Oct. 2013.

Stalker, Pete. "Afghanistan." A Guide to Countries of the World Oxford Reference.             Oxford University Press, 31 Jan. 2013. Web. 06 Oct. 2013

Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems             Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994. Print.